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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal comes to us following a summary 
judgment entered by the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in favor of Allstate Insurance 
Company. In 1999, Allstate decided to reorganize its business 
and terminate the at-will employment contracts of some 6,200 
sales agents, offering them the opportunity to work as 
independent contractors. As a condition of becoming 
independent contractors, agents were required to sign a 
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release waiving existing legal claims against Allstate. The 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued Allstate, 
claiming that the company violated federal antiretaliation 
laws. The District Court disagreed and the EEOC appealed. 
We will affirm. 
I 
 As the District Court rightly noted, the history of this 
case is “lengthy and convoluted.” Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
1 F. Supp. 3d 319, 332 (E.D. Pa. 2014). We won’t repeat that 
history in full because it is so thoroughly explained in Judge 
Buckwalter’s tour de force in Romero and in his opinion now 
under review. See Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co. (EEOC), 3 F. 
Supp. 3d 313 (E.D. Pa. 2014). Instead, we shall summarize 
the facts relevant to this appeal. 
A 
 Over the past thirty years, Allstate has changed the 
way it sells insurance. In the early 1980s, agents worked out 
of Sears stores or company-owned offices under an 
employment contract designated R830. Allstate introduced 
the Neighborhood Office Agent Program in 1984, purportedly 
because it faced “flat productivity and the aggressive use of 
local independent contractor sales agents by its competitors.” 
Allstate Br. 7. New agents hired pursuant to the 
Neighborhood Program signed a contract designated R1500, 
while existing agents had the choice of transferring to that 
contract or continuing their employment under the R830 
contract. The Neighborhood Program allowed agents to 
secure their own office space, manage their own expenses, 
and invest money in their agencies; it did not give them 
transferable interests in their accounts, however, which 
remained the property of Allstate. Under both the R830 and 
R1500 contracts, Allstate agents were at-will employees and 
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were not entitled to any severance pay in the event that they 
were “terminated under the terms of any group 
reorganization/restructuring benefit plan or program[.]” 
Romero, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 336, 397–98. 
 In 1990, the company introduced a third business 
model, the Exclusive Agency Program, pursuant to which all 
new Allstate agents worked as independent contractors under 
a contract called R3001. In that capacity, Allstate agents had 
transferable property interests in their books of business and 
earned higher commissions than the R830 and R1500 
employee agents, but they were neither reimbursed for office 
expenses nor provided employee benefits. Existing employees 
had the opportunity to apply to convert to independent 
contractor status as part of the Exclusive Agency Program, 
but they received no conversion bonus and had to repay any 
outstanding office expenses advanced by Allstate. They did, 
however, gain property rights in the accounts they serviced as 
employee agents, which became transferable after five years. 
 According to Allstate, the Exclusive Agency Program 
emerged as the company’s most productive business model. 
Meanwhile, a settlement between Allstate and the Internal 
Revenue Service required Allstate to more closely supervise 
the operations of its Neighborhood Program agents in order to 
preserve their status as employees for tax purposes. 
Concerned about the inefficiency of running several different 
agency programs, Allstate decided to shift completely to the 
independent contractor model and abandon the R830 and 
R1500 programs. Accordingly, in November 1999, the 
company announced its Preparing for the Future Group 
Reorganization Program, pursuant to which some 6,200 
employee agents would be terminated the following year.  
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 In connection with their termination, the employee 
agents were offered four choices: (1) conversion to 
independent contractor status (the Conversion Option); (2) 
$5,000 and an economic interest in their accounts, to be sold 
by September 2000 to buyers approved by Allstate (the Sale 
Option) (3) severance pay equal to one year’s salary (the 
Enhanced Severance Option); or (4) severance pay equal to 
thirteen weeks’ pay (the Base Severance Option). Employees 
who chose the Conversion Option received a bonus of at least 
$5,000, were not required to repay any office-expense 
advances, and acquired transferable interests in their business 
two years after converting. All employees who chose not to 
convert and left the company were bound by noncompetition 
covenants in the original R830 and R1500 contracts.  
Allstate required those who selected any of the first 
three options to sign a release of all legal claims against the 
company related to their employment or termination, 
including discrimination claims arising under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities 
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Act (ADA).1 The Release covered only claims that had 
accrued by the time the terminated employees signed it, not 
                                                 
1 The Release stated: 
In return for the consideration that I am 
receiving under the Program, I hereby release, 
waive, and forever discharge Allstate Insurance 
Company, its agents, parent, subsidiaries, 
affiliates, employees, officers, shareholders, 
successors, assigns, benefits plans, plan 
administrators, representatives, trustees and 
plan agents (“Allstate”), from any and all 
liability, actions, charges, causes of action, 
demands, damages, entitlements or claims for 
relief or remuneration of any kind whatsoever, 
whether known or unknown, or whether 
previously asserted or unasserted, stated or 
unstated, arising out of, connected with, or 
related to, my employment and/or the 
termination of my employment and my R830 or 
R1500 Agent Agreement with Allstate, or my 
transition to independent contractor status, 
including, but not limited to, all matters in law, 
in equity, in contract, or in tort, or pursuant to 
statute, including any claim for age or other 
types of discrimination prohibited under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
the Americans With Disabilities Act, the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”), the Illinois Human Rights Act, and 
the West Virginia Human Rights Act as those 
acts have been amended, or any other federal, 
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future claims, and it did not bar them from filing charges with 
the EEOC, which many did. Almost all the terminated 
employee agents signed the Release, and thousands of them 
chose the Conversion Option. 
B 
 Despite Allstate’s efforts to avoid litigation, several 
former employee agents filed individual and putative class 
actions in the District Court seeking to invalidate the Release 
and alleging discriminatory discharge, retaliation, ERISA 
violations, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. 
Romero, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 358. The EEOC filed a civil action 
of its own that sought a declaratory judgment invalidating the 
Release on the ground that Allstate illegally retaliated against 
its employee agents by allowing them to continue their 
careers with the company only if they waived any 
discrimination claims. Id. The District Court granted 
summary judgment to Allstate in both cases, 2007 WL 
                                                                                                             
state, or local law or ordinance or the common 
law. I further agree that if any claim is made in 
my behalf with respect to any matter released 
and waived above, I hereby waive any rights I 
may have with respect thereto and agree not to 
take any payments or other benefits from such 
claim. I understand that this release and waiver 
does not apply to any future claims that may 
arise after I sign this Release or to any benefits 
to which I am entitled in accordance with any 
Allstate plan subject to ERISA by virtue of my 
employment with Allstate prior to my 
employment termination date. 
App. 379. 
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1811197 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2007), but we vacated those 
rulings because they were inadequately reasoned and 
insufficiently supported by evidence in the record, 344 F. 
App’x 785 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). We remanded and 
ordered that the cases be reassigned to a different district 
judge and that the parties be permitted to conduct further 
discovery. Id. at 788, 790. 
 On remand, the district judge to whom the cases were 
reassigned consolidated the cases for administrative purposes 
and heard new motions for summary judgment. Romero, 1 F. 
Supp. 3d at 360. In an opinion concerning the employee 
agents’ claims, the District Court granted Allstate summary 
judgment in part but held that trial was needed to determine 
whether the Release was signed knowingly and voluntarily 
and whether it was unconscionable. Romero, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 
419. In a separate opinion, the District Court granted Allstate 
summary judgment in the Commission’s retaliation suit. 
EEOC, 3 F. Supp. 3d at 316. The District Court rejected each 
of the Commission’s theories of retaliation, holding that 
Allstate’s requirement that agents choosing the Conversion 
Option waive their claims was not facially retaliatory because 
the policy did not discriminate on the basis of any protected 
trait, id. at 326; and that Allstate had not specifically 
retaliated against agents who spurned the Release because, 
among other reasons, refusing to sign a release did not 
constitute “protected activity” under the antiretaliation 
statutes, id. at 329–30.2 The EEOC filed this timely appeal. 
                                                 
2 The Court also rejected theories of “anticipatory 
retaliation,” EEOC, 3 F. Supp. 3d at 334–35, and coercion, id. 
at 336; see 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b). The Commission conceded 
at oral argument that these claims are not at issue on appeal. 
 10 
 
II 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345. Our jurisdiction is based 
on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.3 
 Exercising plenary review over the District Court’s 
summary judgment, we will affirm only if, viewing “the 
underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,” we 
conclude that a reasonable jury could not rule for the 
nonmoving party. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 
247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Pa. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 
63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
III 
 Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA proscribe 
discrimination in employment based on several personal 
characteristics. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (race, color, 
religion, sex, national origin); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (age); 42 
                                                 
3 The District Court’s summary judgment was an 
appealable “final decision” despite the pendency of the 
Romero matter because that case was consolidated with the 
EEOC’s action for administrative purposes only. See Romero, 
1 F. Supp. 3d at 360. Although we follow a “case-by-case 
approach” in determining whether a final order in one of 
multiple consolidated cases is immediately appealable, 
Bergman v. City of Atlantic City, 860 F.2d 560, 566 (3d Cir. 
1988), our precedents indicate that immediate appeal in one 
case is appropriate when the cases have not been 
“consolidated for discovery and trial or for all purposes,” id.; 
see Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 
1977).  
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U.S.C. § 12112 (disability). They also prohibit employers 
from retaliating against employees who oppose or complain 
about discriminatory treatment. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe 
Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). The antiretaliation 
provisions “are nearly identical,” and “precedent interpreting 
any one of these statutes is equally relevant to interpretation 
of the others.” Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 
567 (3d Cir. 2002). Employers may not “discriminate against 
any individual because such individual has opposed any act or 
practice made unlawful by [the employment-discrimination 
statutes] or because such individual made a charge, testified, 
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing” under the employment-discrimination 
statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (ADA); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-3(a) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (ADEA). A 
prima facie case of illegal retaliation requires a showing of 
“(1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the 
employer either after or contemporaneous with the 
employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal connection 
between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s 
adverse action.” Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 567–68 (quoting 
Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 
1997)). 
 The EEOC offers a few reasons why we should hold 
that Allstate unlawfully retaliated against its terminated 
employee agents. First, the Commission contends that the 
Release does not fall within the well-established rule that 
employers can require releases in exchange for post-
termination benefits. EEOC Br. 21–24. Second, it argues that 
Allstate’s conduct was per se retaliatory because the company 
“withh[e]ld a privilege of the employees’ employment—the 
offer in the conversion option to continue their careers as 
Allstate agents—if they refused to release all their claims.” 
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Id. at 20. Alternatively, the EEOC claims Allstate retaliated 
against the employee agents who refused to sign the Release 
by denying them the option to continue their careers with the 
company as independent contractors. According to the 
Commission, the holdouts’ refusal to waive their claims 
constituted “protected opposition activity” that prompted 
Allstate to withhold the Conversion Option, an adverse 
employment action. Id. at 32–35. We first address the general 
validity of agreements like Allstate’s Release before turning 
to the Commission’s two theories of retaliation.  
A 
 It is hornbook law that employers can require 
terminated employees to release claims in exchange for 
benefits to which they would not otherwise be entitled. See, 
e.g., Mark A. Rothstein et al., 2 Employment Law § 9.22 (5th 
ed. 2014). Nothing in the employment-discrimination statutes 
undermines this rule—in fact, Congress enacted detailed 
requirements governing employee releases of ADEA claims 
in the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 
(OWBPA). 29 U.S.C. § 626(f); see Oubre v. Entergy 
Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 426–27 (1998). Title VII and 
ADA claims are likewise subject to waiver by terminated 
employees. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 
36, 52 (1974) (“[P]resumably an employee may waive his 
cause of action under Title VII as part of a voluntary 
settlement[.]”); Rivera-Flores v. Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Caribbean, 112 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1997) (“We conclude that 
such releases are permissible under the ADA[.]”). The EEOC 
concedes, as it must, the legality of such releases. EEOC Br. 
17, 20–21, 23; Reply Br. 1, 13.  
 But even when particular requirements have not been 
imposed by statutes like the OWBPA, releases can be invalid 
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for various reasons. For example, they must be knowingly 
and voluntarily signed4 and cannot waive future claims.5 In 
addition, an employee who signs a release must receive 
consideration in return. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(D); 
Long v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 105 F.3d 1529, 1538 (3d Cir. 
1997); Rothstein, supra, § 9.22. 
 The EEOC begins by arguing that the well-settled rule 
that releases of claims are generally valid does not apply to 
the situation presented in this appeal. EEOC Br. 21. The 
Commission’s argument goes like this: the only consideration 
adequate for a release of claims is “severance benefits,” and 
Allstate’s offer of an option to sell insurance as an 
independent contractor does not qualify because the employee 
agents “were not terminated in any normal sense.” Id. at 22–
23 (“[T]he conversion option was not a ‘severance’ benefit, 
but rather the opportunity [for the agents] to continue their 
Allstate careers.”). There are a few problems with the 
Commission’s postulate. 
 For starters, the notion that the Conversion Option was 
inadequate consideration for the Release is remarkably 
                                                 
4 See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 52 n.15. This issue 
remains pending in the Romero case. See supra Section I-B. 
5 See Adams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580, 585 
(6th Cir. 1995) (“An employer cannot purchase a license to 
discriminate.”); Rothstein, supra, § 9.22; see, e.g., Gardner-
Denver, 415 U.S. at 51–52 (“[A]n employee’s rights under 
Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver.”). 
Allstate’s Release did not purport to waive future claims. See 
App. 379 (“I understand that this release and waiver does not 
apply to any future claims that may arise after I sign this 
Release[.]”). 
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counterintuitive. The EEOC concedes that the Sale Option 
and the Enhanced Severance Option, both of which also 
required the employees to sign the Release, were valid. Id. at 
34–35. It nevertheless contends that the Conversion Option—
which was chosen by the vast majority of the terminated 
agents—was illegal. According to the Commission, Allstate 
could have complied with the antiretaliation statutes by 
simply firing all its employee agents for good, instead of 
giving them the opportunity to sell Allstate insurance in a 
different capacity. We are confident that federal laws 
designed to protect employees do not require such a harmful 
result. 
 Second, the Commission’s argument that the 
Conversion Option was inadequate consideration for the 
Release is contrary to the undisputed facts of this case. The 
EEOC suggests that Allstate gave the terminated agents 
essentially nothing in exchange for releasing their claims. See 
EEOC Br. 23–24 (“[T]he Program, instead of offering them 
severance benefits, required them to release all their claims 
against the company in order to continue performing the same 
services for Allstate that they had been performing for 
decades.”). In fact, each employee agent who signed the 
Release did so in exchange for something “in addition to 
anything of value to which the individual already [was] 
entitled[.]” § 626(f)(1)(D). The agents were entitled to neither 
continued employment (because they were at-will employees 
under the R830 and R1500 contracts) nor severance pay 
(because they were terminated pursuant to a group 
reorganization program). Moreover, even though Allstate 
allowed employee agents to convert to independent-
contractor status during the decade preceding the 2000 
restructuring, the Conversion Option was significantly more 
advantageous because it: (1) offered guaranteed conversion, 
 15 
 
whereas Allstate had previously retained discretion to deny 
conversion; (2) came with a bonus; (3) excused repayment of 
any outstanding office-expense advances; and (4) gave the 
converting agent a transferable interest in his or her business 
after two years, rather than five. See id.; Allstate Br. 39. Thus, 
it is clear that Allstate’s Conversion Option offered 
terminated employee agents something of value to which they 
were not otherwise entitled. 
 Finally, the EEOC admits that it knows of not “a single 
decision holding that it is unlawful for an employer to require 
its employees to release all their claims in order to continue 
working for the company.” EEOC Br. 25. Nevertheless, it 
claims that Allstate is similarly bereft of authority supporting 
its position—except for one case, Isbell v. Allstate Insurance 
Co., 418 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2005), which it accuses Allstate 
of misreading. EEOC Br. 25. There, Doris Isbell was 
terminated pursuant to Allstate’s reorganization plan and 
refused to sign the Release, opting for the Base Severance 
Option. Isbell, 418 F.3d at 791–92. She sued Allstate for 
retaliation, but the Seventh Circuit rejected her claims. Id. at 
792–93. The EEOC rightly notes that Isbell does not carry the 
day for Allstate here insofar as the Seventh Circuit rejected 
Isbell’s retaliation claims on the ground that she was not 
terminated for discriminatory reasons, which is inapposite to 
the Commission’s claim that Allstate’s contingent offer of 
conversion was discriminatory retaliation. See id. at 793; 
EEOC Br. 26–27. Nonetheless, we note that the Seventh 
Circuit expressly acknowledged Isbell’s retaliation theory, 
which mirrored the EEOC’s theory here, and found it lacking. 
See Isbell, 418 F.3d at 797 (“Allstate did not retaliate against 
Isbell when it refused to hire her [as an independent 
contractor] after she refused to sign a release of liability.”). 
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Like Isbell, the EEOC here fails to articulate any good 
reason why an employer cannot require a release of 
discrimination claims by a terminated employee in exchange 
for a new business relationship with the employer. We 
acknowledge the Commission’s concerns about the prospects 
of employers trading releases for new business opportunities 
and terminated employees facing “financial pressure” when 
offered such a deal. EEOC Br. 32. But the EEOC fails to 
explain why this financial pressure is more offensive to the 
antiretaliation statutes than the pressure one is bound to feel 
when required to sign a release in exchange for severance 
pay.6 In sum, we are not persuaded by the Commission’s 
efforts to arbitrarily limit the forms of consideration 
exchangeable for a release of claims by a terminated 
employee. 
B 
 Having determined that Allstate’s conduct conformed 
with the settled rule that employers can exchange 
consideration for releases of claims, it is unsurprising that the 
Commission’s theories of retaliation are invalid. The 
Commission posits that Allstate violated the antiretaliation 
statutes first by creating a policy that employee agents who 
                                                 
6 The Commission also fails to show that its nightmare 
scenario—employers using a cycle of layoffs, releases, and 
rehiring to immunize themselves from suit—is a valid 
concern. See EEOC Br. 24–25. There is no indication that 
American employers have done or will do this to insulate 
themselves from the employment-discrimination laws, 
probably because such schemes would destroy employee 
morale, compromise business goodwill, and serve little 
economic purpose. 
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refused to sign the Release would not be permitted to 
continue their Allstate careers, and then by enforcing this 
policy and actually withholding the Conversion Option from 
those agents. Under both theories, the EEOC alleges that the 
“protected employee activity” in question was the refusal to 
sign the Release and the associated “adverse action by the 
employer” was Allstate’s withdrawal of the Conversion 
Option.7 Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 567. In fact, the EEOC has 
established neither protected activity nor an adverse action. 
 The antiretaliation statutes identify two forms of 
protected employee activity: “oppos[ing] any act or practice 
made unlawful by” the employment-discrimination laws and 
initiating or “participat[ing] in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under” those laws. E.g., 
42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). The Commission argues that refusing 
to sign a release constitutes opposition to unlawful 
discrimination, but we disagree. In our view, such inaction 
does not communicate opposition sufficiently specific to 
qualify as protected employee activity. See EEOC v. 
SunDance Rehab. Corp., 466 F.3d 490, 501 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(expressing skepticism that declining to sign a release could 
                                                 
7 The Commission occasionally wavers by suggesting 
that the real adverse action was the termination of the 
employee agents—or at least that their termination was 
functionally equivalent to withdrawal of the Conversion 
Option. See, e.g., EEOC Br. 35. We recognize that dismissing 
an employee qualifies as “adverse action” in common 
parlance, but the relevant action for retaliation purposes was 
the denial of conversion to the agents who refused to sign the 
Release. 
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be protected activity); see also Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 
68 F.3d 694, 702 (3d Cir. 1995) (“A general complaint of 
unfair treatment does not translate into a charge of illegal age 
discrimination.”). Because Allstate’s Release barred its 
signatories from bringing any claims against Allstate 
concerning their employment or termination, employee agents 
who refused to sign it might have done so for any number of 
reasons unrelated to discrimination. Indeed, as Allstate notes, 
the plaintiffs in the Romero case brought claims for breach of 
contract and breach of fiduciary duty. Allstate Br. 51. 
Accordingly, the EEOC cannot show that any adverse action 
taken by Allstate was triggered by opposition to unlawful 
discrimination, dooming its retaliation case at the outset. 
 Even had the Commission been able to establish 
protected activity, its argument would fail for lack of an 
adverse employment action. As we have mentioned, the 
terminated agents were not entitled to convert to independent 
contractor status. See supra Section III-A. And the 
Commission has cited no legal authority for the proposition 
that an employer commits an adverse action by denying an 
employee an unearned benefit on the basis of the employee’s 
refusal to sign a release. There is significant support, 
meanwhile, for the opposite proposition. See SunDance, 466 
F.3d at 502 (collecting cases).  
 The EEOC leans heavily on EEOC v. Board of 
Governors, 957 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1992), but that case only 
clarifies the Commission’s failure in this case to satisfy the 
two essential retaliation elements just discussed. In Board of 
Governors, the Seventh Circuit invalidated a provision of a 
collective bargaining agreement that suspended an 
employee’s contractual right to an internal grievance 
proceeding as soon as the employee initiated a judicial or 
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administrative proceeding concerning his grievance. Id. at 
426–27. The Court held that the CBA provision violated the 
ADEA’s antiretaliation provision because it authorized the 
employer to strip an employee of a “contractual right” and 
adversely alter a “condition of his employment” whenever the 
employee sought relief under the ADEA in an external forum. 
Id. at 430. In that case, the Commission identified a clear 
protected activity (i.e., initiating a discrimination charge in an 
external forum) and paired it with an employer action that 
deprived employees of something to which they were entitled 
(i.e., suspending the right to internal grievance proceedings). 
The EEOC fails to muster the same showing here, which 
makes all the difference. 
IV 
 In offering each of its employee agents the Conversion 
Option, Allstate followed the well-established rule that 
employers can require terminated employees to waive 
existing legal claims in order to receive unearned post-
termination benefits. The EEOC has neither given us reason 
to craft an exception to this rule nor articulated a valid 
retaliation claim under the relevant statutes. We therefore 
hold that Allstate did not violate the federal antiretaliation 
laws by requiring that employee agents sign the Release in 
order to avail themselves of the Conversion Option. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
